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Abstract 
The purpose of this study was to examine t r 
ion in the context of performance-based compensation 
s terns. The researcher specifically sought to address 
research questions: 
1.  To what extent are teachers motivated for 
behavioristic/economic reasons and extrinsic rewards? 
2.  To what extent are teachers motivated for altruistic/PSM 
reasons and intrinsic rewards? 
3.  To what extent are teachers simultaneously motivat by 
both behavioristic/economic and altruistic/PSM means? 
4.  To what extent are behavioristic/economic or 
ruistic/PSM motivators more dominant in what drives 
? 
The data used in this study was gathered from t 
working the Eagle County School District in Colorado in 
bf 2011 .. 278 teachers participated in the survey 
was part of a required evaluation program the di ct 
undertook  to be in compliance with program evaluation 
rements as a federal "Teacher Incentive Fund" grant 
used descriptive statistical analysis 
s on the data to answer the research questions 
s study. From this analysis, some clear 
t 
ii 
conclusions were drawn_ rst, the evidence presented in 
this dissertation suggests that teachers are motivated by 
behavioristic/economic motivators. However whi it appears 
teachers desire to earn more money, this did not seem to 
translate into a clear behavioral change in terms of work 
habits. The evidence did suggest an increased level of 
attention to measures that were tied to compensation. 
Second, teachers are also motivated for altruistic/public 
service motivation reasons. All of educators who 
participat in the survey used in this dissertation were in 
some level of agreement with questions on if they are 
motivated to help others, particularly students. 
Third, the evidence presented here suggests that teachers 
can be simultaneous motivated by both the 
behavioris /economic and the altruistic/public service 
motivation paradigms. 
Finally, the altruistic/public service motivation 
paradigm seems to be the stronger of the two in what drives 
teachers. However, the behavioristic/economic paradigm does 
suggest the ability to draw the attention of educators to 
those things to which financial incentives are attached. 
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Chapter I 
INTRODUCTION 
Calls for the implementation of performance pay plans 
are coming from several voices around the country, not the 
least of which include President Barack Obama and Secretary 
of Education Arne Duncan. While stumping the country as a 
presidential candidate, Obama (as cited in Ion 2008) 
rankled some members the National Education Association 
(NEA) by calling for experimentations with performance pay. 
Secretary Duncan (as cited in Henderson 2009) carried 
through on Obama's campaign rhetoric for the Obama 
administration by advocating for performance pay at the NEA 
national convention in San Diego in 2009, and through the 
Department of Education's continued support for the Teacher 
Incentive Fund (TIF) grants (U.S. Department of Education, 
2010). More recently through the Race to the Top (RTTT) 
program, the federal government generated considerable 
interest and experimentation with per rmance pay by 
leveraging unprecedented amounts of fede education money 
for states and districts to enact a series of human capital 
reforms that included performance-based compensation. 
though the Obama administration's ongoing show of 
support for the idea of performance pay, and their 
willingness to publi y speak about it to relatively 
unsupportive groups like the NEA, demonstrates the 
administration is serious about pushing performance pay as 
an education reform, this is an issue which clearly has 
support on both sides of the political aisle. Beginning in 
2006, with support from Congress and President George W. 
Bush, the U.S. Department of Education has now funded 
nearly $200 million to support experiments with performance 
pay through the aforementioned Teacher Incentive Fund. In 
2008, the Republican platform specifically included support 
for "merit pay for good teachers" and that "school 
districts must have the authority to ... reward the best and 
brightest teachers ... without regard to collective 
bargaining agreements" (Republican National Committee 2008, 
p. 43). 
This increased interest in performance pay has not 
gone unchecked and unnoticed. Many teachers and union 
leaders denounce performance pay plans for a number of 
reasons, including fears that they will undermine 
collaboration among teachers or that these plans will 
unfairly penalize teachers based on mysterious or flawed 
standardized assessments and biased evaluation processes 
(Winans, 2009). At the heart of this opposition is the 
fear that teachers will unfairly be held accountable and 
that these pay systems create unhealthy competition among 
2 
educators, ostensibly destroying collaboration (Ritter & 
Van Roekel, 2008). Other critics of rmance pay r 
that this new form merit pay is just a way for school 
boards or administrators to get back at teachers (Gratz, 
2009a) . 
However, there are signs from national unions that 
their wholesale opposition to the concept appears to 
softening. For example, Randi Weingarten, President of the 
1.5 Ilion member American Teachers Federation (the 
teachers' union in the United States behind 
NEA), has been outspoken about her willingness to work with 
administrations in exploration of performance pay and 
other education reforms and she has touted her 
collaborative work with Mayor Michael Bloomberg in ing 
a performance pay for New York City Schools, the 
largest public school district in United States. 
According to Wei (as cited in Honowar 2008), when 
3 
king to the issue of performance pay, "no issue should 
be off the table, provided it is good for children and fair 
to teachers." Even the generally slower moving NEA is 
beginning to show some initial signs of acceptance of the 
of performance pay, provided some reasonable des 
principles are followed (American Association of School 
4 
Administrators, National Education Association, National 
Association School Boards, 2011). 
Local union leaders places like Denver publ 
schools and Eagle county schools in Colorado have shown 
this collaborative spi t in working with their 
administrations and boards to develop fully functioning 
performance pay systems in which the traditional step and 
lane system has been completely laced. The question has 
moved from if schools should adopt some kind of performance 
pay system is beginning to now move to how and there are a 
number of districts across the country solving the 
technical problems with the change t once were seen as 
barriers to implementing these new compensation models. 
What Motivates Teachers 
A central question that arises as districts consider 
the implement on of a performance-based compensation 
system is: what motivates teachers? One possibility is 
that performance pay mostly rests on the premise that 
teachers can be motivated by extrinsic rewards, such as 
attaching cash to test scores or evaluation scores. Much 
like the car dealer or the insurance salesperson working on 
commission for vehicles or policies sold, the logic of this 
behaviori c/economic paradigm is that teachers should be 
rewarded for getting students to achieve or for 
demonstrating great teaching (and also punished financially 
by reducing their compensation in comparison with their 
peers). This thinking comes from a Skinner-esque paradigm 
where employees focus on improving those things to which 
incentives are attached (Skinner, 1938) and an economic 
paradigm that rational people respond to financ I (or 
remunerative) incentives. 
Opposing these behaviorist /economic views is the 
idea that teachers are actually motivated by altruistic or 
intrinsic rewards. This paradigm tells us that teachers 
are motivated to help their students achieve and improve 
because provides me~ning and importance to r lives. 
This altruistic, or public service motivation (PSM) 
paradigm holds that the idea of offering some amount of 
money to teachers to get them to work harder and provide 
better instruction is insulting to teachers, who would 
already do anything ,they could to help students succeed 
because prov s them int ic gratification (Gratz, 
2009b; Perry, Mesch & Paarlburg, 2006b). 
Frederick Herzberg (1959) presented his two-factor 
theory as a model for how these two opposing views might 
coexist. Herzberg theoriz that there were two sets of 
factors that af cted satisfaction and job performance. 
Herzberg's ctors were a set of motivators and a set of 
5 
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hygiene factors. Herzberg argued that both sets of ors 
were important, but attention to the hygiene factors 
was important to prevent job dissati ction and attent 
to motivators was important to increase job 
performance. 
Problem Statement 
In recent years re has been a dramatic increase 
interest, and in the implementation of, performance-based 
compensation systems. However, in the design of these 
systems, little account or consideration is given to the 
underlying psychological mechanisms that may be at work 
that would make or break the ability of se compensation 
systems to actually alter behavioral patterns, improve 
teaching, and ultimately improve student arning. More 
simply, 1 Ie thought is given to how perfbrmance pay 
systems would actually work in improving teaching and 
learning. The quest of what mot s teachers is 
almost always left out of the debate in rationale to 
implement these systems. 
Further, little research has been conducted looking· 
speci cally at teacher motivation in a rformance-based 
compensation context. More directly, while research does 
exist looking at motivators and the e ct.of compensation 
on mot ion, little this research cuses on the 
6 
particular and important case of teachers in the context of 
performance based compensation. 
This study investigates what motivates teachers in the 
context of a performance-based compensation system and can 
provide insight into the problem of a generally poor 
understanding of the psychological mechanisms at work in 
the design of various compensation systems. Further, this 
study can provide practical insight to policy makers and 
practitioners in the development and implementation of 
performance-based compensation systems. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study is to explore the influence 
of behavioristic versus altruistic paradigms in what 
7 
motivates teachers. This study investigates if one or both 
of these paradigms of motivation holds true for teachers. 
Further, this study investigates which paradigm is more 
dominant, if these two paradigms are not mutually exclusive 
of each other, and if the behavioristic view can actually 
operate along· with the altruistic view. Finally, the study 
investigates if a performance pay system can serve to focus 
the attention of educators on measures attached to 
financial incentives. 
Research Questions 
The specific research questions 
address are as follows: 
will 
1. To what extent are teachers mot 
behavioristic/economic reasons and ext s 
rewards? 
2. To what extent are teachers motivated 
altruistic/PSM reasons and int nsic rewa ? 
3. To what extent are teachers simultaneously mot 
by both behavioristic/economic and altruist /PSM 
means? 
4. To what extent are behavioristic/economic or 
altruistic/PSM motivators more dominant 
drives teachers? 
Source of Data: Eagle County Schools 
what 
I use data from Eagle county schools (ECS), where a 
performance-based pay system is used. ECS is a public 
school district of approximately 6,000 students 1 
the Central Colorado Rocky Mountains. ECS is made up of 19 
schools, including nine traditional PreK-5 e ary 
schools, four traditional 6~8 middle schools, two 
traditional 9-12 high schools, one alternative 9-12 gh 
school, one 6-12 ski and snowboard academy, and two 
district charter schools. ECS serves the s resort 
8 
communit s of Vail and Beaver Creek as well as rural 
communities in a county covering approximately 1,700 square 
miles. All employees working for ECS are part of a 
performance pay system, with the except of temporary 
workers and employees working in one of the district's two 
charter schools (one school is part a separate 
performance pay system, one is not). Because of the 
district's near decade long history in using one of the 
most ssive implementations of performance pay in 
country with its staff, data gathered from the distr 
presents a rare opportunity to measure motivations 
publ educators who are exposed to significant financial 
rewards performance-based outcomes. 
The ECS History with Perfor.mance Pay 
e County Schools adopted performance pay as 
of a sweeping human capital and instruct reform in 
2001 with widespread implementation occurring in 2002. 
This change came with the election of an innovative and 
reform ented board of education with a predominately 
business-minded management approach. This board led the 
district to adopt performance pay as a reaction (in part) 
to competition the dist ct faced from a number of private 
and er school options students, as well as 
relative stagnant assessment results. 
9 
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2001 reform was comprehensive in scope. It 
cont not only a performance pay component, but also 
of the Milken Family Foundation's Teacher 
Advancement Program (TAP) model which has four key 
s. first component of the TAP model is 
~l e Career Paths in which teachers are asked to choose 
a ro Career Teacher, Mentor Teacher, or Master Teacher. 
Master Teacher roles come with a decrease in 
direct truction responsibilities, an increase in 
coaching and leadership responsibilities, a peer-evaluation 
, and a monetary stipend for the additional time and 
re s accompanying these positions. The second 
component is Ongoing, Applied Professional Growth where 
s structures and supports for professional 
built the teaching day including coaching, 
ion of innovative instructional methods, and 
eraction centered on students. The third component 
is Ins onally Focused Accountability which refers to a 
ive and intensive system of teacher evaluation 
and assessments to determine teacher effectiveness 
achievement. The final component is 
ce-Based Compensation. 
ECS adopted the rst three components as prescribed 
by Milken Family Foundation and made significant 
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11 
efforts to low them with integrity as prescribed by 
organization. However, the performance pay component was a 
compl y lly developed and no~el approach. 
The entire program, including the performance pay 
system, was commonly referred to throughout the as 
TAP. It is important to note that while the Milken ly 
Foundation did provide consulting services and supports 
this i i phase, the existing ECS administration and 
board at time was responsible for the implementation 
of this s cant reform. Schools were brought into 
system waves beginning in 2002, but all schools (with 
the ion of the district charter school) and 1 
emplo (including both teachers and principals but so 
district 0 ice staff and all support/classified employees) 
were red to participate by 2006. 
With adoption of this performance pay system, ECS 
was first district in the country to compl y abandon 
the step lane salary schedule since its widespread 
adoption beginning in the 1920's. 
ECS evolved through two major iterations of 
performance pay. The aforementioned TAP system was 
place from 2002-2007 and a second system (intentionally 
without a name) from 200B-present. In the rst 
implementation (TAP), ECS used a system of student 
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12 
achievement and evaluation scores to arrive at a bonus and 
salary increase. A goal of this first phase system was to 
attach compensation as closely as possible to the 
achievement results of the students with whom each 
individual teacher worked. In effect, this was an attempt 
to measure the academic impact for each individual teacher 
and attach pay to this measure as closely as possible. 
The technical complexities of ECS's TAP system 
resulted in incredibly complicated and different systems 
for all its various groups of employees. Some teachers 
could be reasonably linked to their students (relying on 
the district's student information system class rosters), 
but many could not. For example, the third grade teacher 
who teaches math, reading, and writing was directly linked 
to student results for those subjects. However, even this 
simple linkage raises technical concerns. As teachers, 
especially at elementary grades, work in dynamic and 
various forms of co-teaching models, it is very difficult 
to specify which teachers really teach which kids. While 
technical solutions to this issue have been developed, the 
ECS method of relying purely on the district's student 
information system frequently led to a misalignment of 
teachers to student results. 
13 
Furthermore, re were a number of t rs for whom 
no valid and reI e assessments were available to 
quantify student evement results for an individual 
payout calculation. For example, the teacher, the 
special education teacher, and the language acquisition 
teacher, and early childhood teacher 1 had to default 
to a building level calculation using core curriculum 
(reading, writing, assessments. 
The district payout calculations were further 
complicated by.the school calendar. Because the district 
uses trimesters that 1 the amount of direct instruction 
any single teacher might have with a part ar student at 
secondary level, ievement results could not be 
directly linked to any high school staff as time each 
teacher had with students could be as little as one sixth 
of an instructional day for one third of school year. 
Even further complicating the system, district 
administrators and staff were also involved in this 
rformance pay plan requiring a number of simultaneously 
operating systems to deal with the dif s between 
building and district employees, salaried and hourly 
employees, and quasi-instructional pos - like 
counselors and spec 1 education service providers - and 
direct core content tructional staff. 
14 
This first implementation of the TAP system was also 
characterized by a top down implementation strategy. One 
high level district administrator tasked with implementing 
performance pay during this first implementation told 
outside evaluators in 2007 that his job was to "cram 
performance pay down peoples' throats." This approach 
resulted in "backlash, animosity; and an erosion of trust" 
in the district from many employees (Performance Based 
Compensation Steering Committee Final Report, 2008). Also, 
the district wa~ characterized negatively in the press by 
employees and the community on a regular basis. Further, 
the district experienced one of the worst teacher attrition 
rates in the state of Colorado during this time period, 
averaging teacher turnover in excess of 19% annually and an 
estimated annual cost of $122,700 to the district from 
2001-2004 (Paone et al., 2008). 
A number of internal tensions led to a series of 
resignations and forced removals from the district's 
central leadership staff. This resulted in a near clean 
decapitation of district leadership in the summer of 2007 
and a replacement with new leaders (including a new 
Superintendent, CFO, Curriculum Director, HR Director, 
Communications Director, and ESL Director), the district 
began a comprehensive evaluation of the performance pay 
15 
system. This involved the creation of a la and 
representative group led the Performance Based 
Compensation Steering Committee, which purposefully 
included a number critics of the existing formance 
pay system and significant teachers' union representation. 
Using a consensus-based de sion model, this group sought 
input from several levels of the organization, studied 
performance pay systems from around the country, made its 
work and s decisions transparent to all, and vetted s 
decisions with the administration, the Board of Education, 
the teachers' union, and several non-unionized employee 
groups (maintenance, transportation, food service, 
technology, etc). 
The resulting recommendations from this group brought 
about the second iteration of performance pay in ECS which 
was implemented at the end of the 2007-08 school year. 
This second iteration of performance pay still 
dif ntiates compensation for all employees based on 
student assessment and employee evaluation, but 
standardizes the process for all employees. For student 
assessment, the revised system relies on an index of 
building and dist ct level assessment results from a 
variety of tests and a number of test analysis methods. 
For employee evaluation, each employee is evaluated a 
16 
continuous annual s by evaluators who are trained to 
improve reliability. The new system performance pay 
developed in ECS in 2007 intentionally s not have a 
name. On the advice the performance sed compensation 
steering committee and direction of district 
administration, this new model was to be considered how the 
st ct does bus ss when it comes to compensation and 
that this was an integral part of ECS and not an add-on 
program. 
With this change to a new performance pay system, 
s cant effort was put forward (and continues to be put 
forward) in communicating the change, honestly addressing 
concerns, and emphasi ng the creating a culture of 
learning and continuous evolution for district. 
L~itations and Del~itations 
While there may no better case investigating 
motivational rs that drive t than using 
s data from ECS, are also a number of limitations 
in this study. 
One of these 1 ions comes from the district 
sampled. This is a study of a smaller (approximately 6,000 
students), rural dist ct inclusive of two world class ski 
resorts. Just looking at purely demographic and geographic 
1 ions, some caution should be observed when 
17 
generalizing the re s to school cts and educators 
in other settings. 
A second 1 tation exists because there is a 
ficant possibility that exposure to a performance-
based pay system these 9 years fundamentally changed 
the educators working for ECS and that their motivations 
may in fact be different from tpose working in typical and 
traditional compensation systems. so, in 2006, ECS 
received a Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) grant for 
approximately 6 .million dollars over 5 years from the U.S. 
Department of Education to support s forts in 
experimenting with performance pay. While the purpose of 
the TIF grant is to encourage compensation innovation among 
school districts, it represents a large funding source 
provided technical support and pro ssional development 
opportunities for ECS that otherwise would not have 
sted. As a re ECS has been to undertake 
several unusually ambitious and techni efforts and 
compensation practices that it might not have been able to 
do on its own revenues. 
A third limitat arises from reliance on only 
quantitative data and the statist 1 analysis techniques 
used in this study. While this method does provide this 
study with a relatively large number of responses and 
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convenient means to analyze the information, the rel 
on purely quantitat means does limit the ability to more 
completely investi e the topic. 
A final of 1 tation comes from the instrument used 
in the survey. instrument was designed by a social 
psychologist and a pSYGhometrician with the express purpose 
of answering written into the evaluation portion 
of the federal TIF grant the district received. While I 
did have some into the design of this instrument, the 
primary role of trument construction and administration 
was handled by someone besides myself. 
This study also conta a number of delimitations. 
First, it uses a a purposefully sampled school 
dist ct that used a performance pay system. The 
rationale to use a from this particular district was 
based on the opportunity to capture data on teacher 
motivation from with extensive experience in a 
performance-based system (a relatively rare situation) 
and my access to t s information. 
Second, study intentionally focused on the 
question of r motivation in a performance-based pay 
context and specifically did not address the common, 
question whether such compensation schemes have an effect 
on student achievement. 
19 
Third, study does not address the reasons why 
teachers might have behavioristic/economic motivations or 
altruistic/PSM motivations, but instead focuses on r 
re ive presence, absence, or coexistence. 
Definition of Terms 
trusitism: Altruism is the idea that peop are 
motivated to help others and improve themselves for 
intrinsic reasons. 
Behaviorism: Behaviorism is the theoretical model of 
motivation built on B.F. Skinner's (1938) ideas of 
responses to stimuli. 
Compensa on: Monetary remuneration for services 
provided. While compensation may actually ta on many 
forms, in this study context is restricted to 
fiscal elements. 
Economic: This term re rs to a financially driven 
system built on supply and demand that assumes rati 
people respond to nancial incentives~ 
Microeconomic: This term refers to a subset of 
economic thinking focused on individual- 1 decisions as 
opposed to nations or other large scale actors. 
Performance-Based Compensation: Compensation systems 
bui on a son or group's ability to perform some task 
or job 1. 
20 
Public Service Motivation Theory: The theory that 
those working in the private sector are primarily driven or 
motivated to advance the public good and also are motivated 
by being part of collective efforts rather than individual 
efforts. 
Step and Lane: This term refers to the traditional 
compensation system for educators where pay is determined 
by years of experience and number of education credits "that 
teachers hold. 
Teacher Advancement Program (TAP): Professional 
development and career ladder model ECS used in designing 
the district's human capital reform in 2001. 
S~a~ 
ECS is one of the few districts in the nation to have 
actually adopted a performance-based model of compensation 
and it can certainly be argued that the ECS system is among 
the most transformational changes in existence in educator 
compensation models. Also, the ECS system has undergone 
two iterations of performance pay and has been in existence 
over 9 years. However at its core, ECS is still a public 
education school district that seeks to provide a quality, 
free education to any student that appears at its doors. 
It is because this public school district has implemented a 
performance-based pay system that it also makes a near 
per ct test case to inves gate and make inferences about 
the motivations of American public educators. 
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The ECS experience presents the rare opportunity to 
study attitudinal attributes of public school educators who 
are working for an organization that s aggressively 
implemented a performance pay system. is is still a 
comparatively unusual find and will provide insights 
unavailable from any r existing a sources. 
Fundamentally, this study seeks to explore what 
motivates teachers. From this study, we might gain a 
better understanding how performance pay works from 
individual, psychological level of the educator. This wo 
has significant implications as more and more districts 
around the country move to performance-based pay systems 
and are engaged in the ongoing design 
these systems. 
refinement of 
Knowing how educators are motivated and what they work 
for is a critical component to cons as performance-
, designed, and ba compensation ems are cons 
implemented nationally. 
Going forward, s study is organized into four 
chapters. Chapter II will review the extant literature 
relating to the topics of performance-based compensation 
and on human mot ion. Chapter III will layout the 
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research design r the study including research 
questions and how data will be analyzed. Chapter IV 
will present results. Finally, study will end with 
chapter V as a summary and statement of ications for 
policy, pract , and future research. 
23 
Chapter II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction 
For the literature review portion of this 
ssertation, I review the 1 r research on performance 
pay in some detail, and then move to a focused review of 
research on teacher mot ion and how it is an important 
concept to consider in the implementation of performance-
approaches to educator compensation. 
The central question I seek to answer is on teacher 
mot ion. More speci ly, are teachers motivated 
a stic reasons or for economic reasons? Or, can 
be some overlap of these two motivations, wherein each is 
not mutually exclusive of other. While teacher 
mot ion is of primary concern, the question of 
motivation in this study is viewed through the lens of its 
importance in the performance-based compensation 
scussion. That is, can we motivate teachers with money? 
This literature review broadly considers sources 
lusion. These come from arti s in peer reviewed 
journals, scholarly articles non-peer reviewed j s, 
published manuscripts, edit chapters in books, publi 
books on performance pay, and publications from 
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foundations, associations, and education policy think-
t This literature- review speci cally excludes non-
empirically or theoretically-based opinion pieces, popular 
literature sources, and other less schol y sources on 
this subject. 
Defining Performance Pay 
To begin a discussion of performance pay, it is 
important to define what it is. Generally, compensation 
systems for teachers come in relatively few variations. 
traditional method of paying teachers (employed by the 
vast majority of school districts in United States) 
uses a step and lane, or lock-step, scale that 
differentiates teacher pay based on a combination of 
experience and higher education credits- or advanced 
degrees. Like a ian coordinate system, one can 
determine salary by simply finding number that 
corre~ponds with s of exper on one axis and the 
teacher's education level on another. For teachers to 
advance in pay they need just to earn more educational 
credits or gain another year of experience. Step 
and lane systems also frequently add additional pay to 
teachers through cost of living shi s arplied across the 
whole grid in any particular school district. 
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These compensation systems rose to prevalence in the 
States beginning the 1920's as a reaction to pay 
s ems based on race, gender, or nepotism. It is 
important to acknowledge that the step lane pay system 
was an important compensation innovation as it effectively 
removed these discriminatory practices from educator pay. 
In the United States, the step and lane pay system has been 
in use for nearly a century now and sents the near 
rsal and standard approach to teacher compensation 
(Protsik, 1995). Other than through a r's ability to 
be retained for another year (which is not particularly 
fficult in the eld of public education outside of 
reductions due to budget shocks), this kind of compensat 
s em typically does not contain dif ion elements 
based on any kind of rformance. 
Performance pay, on the other hand, is described by 
J. Adams and John S. Heywood (2009) as "earnings ... 
linked to some measure of performance il (p.15). Adams and 
Heywood go on to present a taxonomy of rformance pay 
systems from a private sector perspect which modifies a 
previous taxonomy ented by Milkovich and Wigdor (1991). 
As Adams and Heywood sent an approach grounded in the 
business world, I further modified s approach to 
include concepts within Adams and Heywood's paradigm that 
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fit an educator compensation setting. Table 1 presents 
this thinking: 
Table 1 
Matrix of Performance Pay Types in an Educational Context 
Relationship 
to 
Base Pay 
Adds 
Doesn't Add 
Type of 
Performance 
Determination 
Formulaic 
Judgmental 
Formulaic 
Judgmental 
Levels of Measurement Examples 
Individual 
Increases based 
on standardized 
test scores 
linked to the 
individual 
teacher (e.g. 
value added). 
Increases based 
on individual 
evaluation scores 
or individual 
objectives/goals. 
Bonuses based on 
standardized test 
scores linked to 
the individual 
teacher 
(e.g. value 
added) .9 
Bonuses based on 
individual 
evaluation scores 
or individual 
objectives/goals. 
Group 
Increases based on 
district, building, 
or team standardized 
test results. 
(e.g. attainment or 
growth measures) . 
Increases based on 
teams or groups 
meeting shared 
objectives or goals. 
(e.g. creating a 
positive school 
culture) . 
Bonuses based on 
district, building, 
or team standardized 
test results. 
(e.g. attainment or 
growth measures) . 
Bonuses based on 
teams or groups 
meeting shared 
objectives or goals. 
(e . .g. creating a 
positive school 
culture) . 
Table 1 shows how this taxonomy can look in an 
educational context. Relationship to Base Pay indicates 
whether or not the payment is added to the employee's base 
pay (effectively creating an ongoing salary increase for 
the employee, as is the case with the Denver Public 
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Schools' ProComp system) or does not add and is a stand-
bonus on top of regular base pay (as is the case with 
Houston Independent School District's Aspire program). 
Type Performance Determination is broken down into two 
Formulaic and Judgmental. Formulaic 
re r to those that can be calculated based on some 
mathemat 1 formula. Formulaic payments tend to be more 
objective and rely on predefined targets and quantitative 
measures to determine performance. Judgmental 
nations refer to payments where a human evaluation 
of some type is required to determine the performance. 
Judgmental payments tend to be more subjective and rely on 
human eva ion to determine performance. 
Whi this taxonomy clarifies the types of performance 
pay may exist schools, there are a number of 
additional methods of differentiating pay not based on 
performance or traditional step and level system. 
Table 2 sents a number of other Differentiated Pay 
systems some schools pay systems which may 
be used with a step and lane based pay system or a 
performance s pay system. 
Table 2 
Matrix of Differentiated Pay in an Educational Context 
Additional Duty 
Differentiated Career Path 
Pay 
Eli te Teacher 
e 
• "High Needs" or "Hard 
Fill" bonuses. 
• Di pay tracks 
Special Education or 
• After School Tutoring 
• Extra cular Pay 
• Extended Day 
• Extended Year 
• Mentor r Role 
• Master Teacher Role 
• Group s 
• rtment Heads 
• National Board of 
Profess I Teaching 
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to 
for 
Standa Certification 
• State Master Teacher 
Certificat 
• "Teacher of the Year" 
Awards 
Table 2 shows several types and examples of 
differentiated pay. Market-Based Pay refers to payments 
school districts may make where the market requires that 
the district offer additional compensation a particular 
position where supply and demand factors se the 
relative price ta s to employ a quali person in 
. that role. Schools or stricts that are high poverty or 
that have diverse demographics and positions that deal with 
highly demanding, technical, or competit subject matters 
, 
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are more difficult to staff. Market-based incentives can 
used to incentivize individuals taking on these 
ro s. Additional Duty Pay refers to additional payments 
to staff who ta on extra roles outs the 
ass room. Di tiated Career Pa payments are made to 
teachers who take on teacher leadership and/or coaching 
ro s with their rs. Elite Teacher refers to added 
pay for holding a rare and difficult to obtain credential, 
like National Board Professional Teaching Standards 
certification, or through being designated an excellent 
teacher through some rigorous and performance 
discriminating int or external review process. 
With the exception of the step and lane pay system, 
of these dif rentiated pay types certainly represent 
novel approaches to compensating teachers that are outside 
typical box educator pay. However, it is important 
to note that these are not typically formance-based 
approaches because they are not linked to measures of 
teacher (input) or student (output) performance (or any 
other measures of formance). Of course, an exception to 
s could be if differentiated pay options were only 
made available to teachers who had demonstrated some 
level of high performance, but this is unusual in actual 
practice. 
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This p ous section builds on a Chinese proverb: 
\\ path to wisdom begins by calling things by ir 
names." It is important to note that there are key 
rences between performance pay, different pay, 
and traditional step and lane system (or salary 
s , or lock-step systems). Teachers' unions and 
opposed to any kind of performance-based approach to 
compensation frequently use the term me pay to refer to 
performance pay plans and to disparage a ed 
approach. Donald Gratz (2009a) elaborates: 
Teacher unions, among others, often view me as a 
subjective judgment made by a I or other 
supervisor ... They see merit pay as a disguised 
example of an "old boy" network, in which a principal 
(or superintendent or school board) rewards favored 
teachers ... a subj ecti ve and unaccountable measure of a 
teacher's worth that puts teachers at mercy of 
the supervisors and therefore of pol ics and 
favoritism (p. 11). 
is, the term merit pay is associated with se 
sparaging views of performance-based compensation or is 
associated with old models and attempts at tying pay to 
As such, this term will be avoided in this 
ssertation. 
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As we have seen through this discussion, when one goes 
outside the traditional step and lane pay system, there can 
exist a great deal of complexity and variation educator 
compensation. Understanding what is, and what is not, 
performance pay is a fundamental step. 
Perfor.mance Pay, Measurement and Student Achievement 
Of key importance in the debate over pe rmance pay 
are the questions of appropriate measurement of performance 
and the question if performance pay s an impact on 
student achievement. While this study is not centrally 
concerned with either of these questions, but rather is 
focused on the question of teacher motivation as it relates 
to performance pay, it is necessary to explore the research 
on: (a) the complexity of implementing these systems, (b) 
the creation of valid and reliable performance measures, 
and (c) student achievement as it relates to performance 
pay. 
Opposition and Complexity 
A number of studies suggests that modern performance 
pay implementations have had a poor track record of support 
and success among educators (Heneman & Young 1991; Ballou & 
Podgursky 1993; Springer et al. 2010a), particularly where 
teachers were organized (Ballou, 2001). Education theorist 
Al Kohn was written and opined copiously on the idea 
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that performance pay and education are incompatible 
concepts due to the fundamental conflict between the 
behavio st and al stic ideas discussed previously (Kohn 
1993, 2003). 
More broadly, studies of performance pay in other 
government agencies have found it to implemented poorly 
and conclusions have been rather pessimi c and negative 
about probability of future success of these pay 
schemes the public sector (Ingraham, 1993; Kellough & 
Lu, 1993; Milkovich & Wigdor, 1991; Perry, Mesch, & 
Paarlberg, 2006). 
By finition, performance pay must be based on some 
indicator of performance. Defining what this performance 
is and measuring it are cr ical technical challenges to 
any pe rmance pay system and these metrics are often more 
subject and difficult to define in a public sector 
setting where more objective metrics are present in private 
sector endeavors (units made or sold, pro , etc). 
Further complicating the possibility of a successful 
educational implementation of performance pay is the 
complex and daunting task accurately measuring quality 
teaching student achievement. 
Regarding quality teaching, a number research 
articles appeared whi document that a critical 
complexity to performance pay is ability to accurately 
measure this concept. Quality teaching is a complex and 
contextual concept that occurs in a constantly dynamic 
environment, swirling with a number of competing and 
confounding influences. Studies have identified these 
complexities as problematic in successfully implementing a 
performance pay system (Ballou, Sanders, & Wright, 2004; 
Murnane & Cohen, 1986) and Podgursky and Springer (2007) 
review these complexities and research supporting their 
existence and problematic nature in detail. 
Wh the concept of teacher quality is complex and 
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our measures of it are imperfect, there have been several 
studies over the past 30 years that do show positive 
results for a principal's ability to evaluate and 
successfully identify quality teachers (Armor et al., 1976; 
Cooper & Cohen, 1997; Dee & Keys, 2004; Jacob and Lefgren, 
2005; Murnane, 1975; Sanders & Horne, 1994;). Thus, while 
our ability to define and measure qual teaching as an 
input shows some promise, it is still evolving. Large 
scale efforts have emerged across the country to define and 
accurately measure quality teaching through teacher 
evaluation. To a large degree, these efforts are due to 
the influence on policy of the landmark position paper on 
the subject of teacher evaluation from The New Teacher 
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Project called "The Widget Effect U (Weisberg, Sexton, 
Mulhern, & Keeling, 2009). 
While measures of effective teaching input as hered 
through teacher evaluation instruments are just begi 
to in terms of being a valid and reliable 
measures educational output have grown tremendously number 
and sophistication. This is not to say that any of these 
assessments or methods of analysis are per measures for 
, in all academic subjects, and at all times. 
, it is to say that we have many more qual y 
assessments from which to make inferences about student 
lity and teacher quality than ever be and this trend 
appears .to be increasing. This dramatic increase and 
improvement of our capacity for better student assessment 
s comes in no small part to the accountability 
rements under 2001's No Child Left Behind Act (2001), 
whi requires states to create systemic core subject 
assessment systems or face being shut out of ral 
funding education. While NCLB is ce~tainly not without 
s ics, the argument can certainly be made the 
law spurred the creation of several standardi state 
assessment systems in a relatively short pe od of time. 
are now reading, math, and science assessments 
across multiple grades in every state in the country and 
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many states have assessments in content areas outside se 
core areas. 
Assessment data one part of measuring student 
performance, or output. However, how assessment data is 
analyzed and what in rences are drawn from it are critical 
points. NCLB mostly requires states to develop 
"attainment" based ana is methods which look at the 
percentage of students who were at or above some state-
defined proficiency bar. As student performance on these 
assessments is heavily luenced by student variables such 
as economic condition and disability, not surprising 
many states and stricts fail to meet NCLB 
requirements in spec 1 education or as they become more 
ly and economical diverse. These attainment-based 
methods of looking at student data are 1 ting the goal is 
to make an inference on performance because these methods 
do not take into account student starting points or the 
important contextual abIes known to have an impact on 
re s on standardized tests. 
Value-added anal s has emerged as a fairly 
controversial way of making an inference on teaching 
formance for teachers in tested subjects and grades. 
Va added analysis uses a student's own cal test 
results to create a predicted future score, thus allowing 
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student to act as their own statistical control and 
removing much of fects of race, economic condition, 
and disability that heavily influences achievement results. 
By evaluating how several students assigned to a teacher 
in relation to their predicted , it is 
possible to make an inference about te r quality using 
value added method. While the debate rages over the 
statistical accuracy of these measures(Ba ret al., 2010; 
Goldhaber, 2010; Lockwood & McCaffrey, 2007) is now 
argued that through use of value-added analysis 
provides a fairly sound way of inferring t r 
e iveness, as measured by student academic progress, 
whi controlling for individual student characteristics 
azerman et al., 2010). 
While value added analysis has the potential to 
provide some of the ion' needed to create an 
estimate of teacher e iveness, output measures for the 
ority of teachers elusive. Using typ lly 
tested subjects and grades only provides us with data on 
approximately one-third teachers. While this can be 
expanded through adding additional tested subjects and 
grades and by adding course exams, handling the 
number of teachers for whom value added estimates 
cannot be calculated is a consideration if a school 
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district is to construct a performance pay system using a 
student outcome measure. Several districts nat ly have 
implemented and continue to experiment with how to include 
teachers in the untested subjects and grades in a 
performance-based system (Adams Simon, 2009). 
Certainly one reason why the step and lane pay system 
has persisted for so long, and one reason why schools face 
dif culty in moving toward a performance-based approach, 
is the relat ease and objectivity with which the two 
metrics by which teachers are typically paid, namely years 
of experience and education credits, can be objectively 
measured. 
Successes 
While implementing a performance pay system is complex 
and contentious from a theoretical and practical 
standpoint, there are also several studies which show what 
Podgursky and Springer (2007) characterized as pos 
effects of performance pay systems on student achievement. 
International studies from India, Kenya, the United 
Kingdom, and Israel all show some posit student 
achievement as a result of schools implementing performance 
pay systems (Atkinson, Burgess, Croxon, Gregg, Popper, 
Slater, & Wilson, 2004; Glewwe, Ilias & Kremer, 2010; Lavy 
2002, 2004; Muralidaran & Sundararaman, 2006). While these 
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schemes and systems of performance pay these studies are 
varied, and certainly the educational contexts are 
rent, these studies do indicate some support for the 
idea that implementi a performance pay system leads to 
improved student achievement. 
Correlation es in the United States have also 
yielded similar results. Studies from Arkansas, Dallas, 
Michigan show improved student achievement as a result 
of implementing performance pay systems (Clot Iter and 
Ladd, 1996; Eberts, Hollenbeck, & Stone, 2002; Winters, 
Ritter, Barnett, & Greene, 2006). Figlio and Kenny (2007) 
performed a national study using the Nat I Educational 
Longitudinal Survey of 1988 and the 1993-94 Schools and 
Sta ing Surveys to determine if the existence of a 
formance pay scheme had an effect on 
a evement. Figlio and Kenny found that incent pay 
did in fact have significant and pos effects 
on student achievement. They estimated the of this 
e to be comparable to a one standard deviat 
ase in days absent an average student, and an 
increase in maternal education of 3 years. 
Along with the studies that have outlined the 
successes of performance pay systems in terms student 
a evement, there are several districts and states that 
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have successfully implemented these systems and sustained 
them for several years, such as Minnesota's Q-Comp system 
and Florida's STAR program (replacing the MAP program which 
was also a performance-based system). Evaluation results 
from the Benwood Initiative in Tennessee, Denver's ProComp 
system, the evaluation of the nat 1 TAP System, and the 
Texas districts participating the D.A.T.E. program all 
show that performance pay, when implemented as part of a 
comprehensive and intensive educat reform ef , are 
associated with positive correlations with student 
achievement (National Institute for lence ,in Teaching 
2010; Silva, 2008; Springer et ., 2010; Wiley, Spindler,& 
Shubert 2010) . 
Human Motivation and Performance Pay 
According to a literature review on subject of 
performance pay by James Perry, Trent Engbers, and So Yun 
Jun (2009), two intertwined psychological theories provide 
support for the use of performance pay. 
t, from bus ss management research, expectancy 
theory (in the context of performance pay) pos s that 
employees will put forth effort if they ct that 1 
result in an outcome they value (Van Eerde & Theirry, 
1996). To put another way, organizations need to create 
rewards for behaviors they want to see in employees and 
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ma sure they are rewards the employees want. If the 
organization does this, employees will work harder to 
these rewards (Vroom & MacCrimmon, 1968). 
This expectancy theory builds on the 
behavi st/economic framework outlined in Chapter I. 
ancy theory holds that behaviors will change to meet 
the goals to which desired economic outcomes are attached. 
The second important, and closely related, theory 
Perry, Engbers, and Yun Jun (2009) bring forward is 
reinforcement theory, which has a foundation in Skinner-
e behaviorism (Skinner, 1938). The behaviorist 
paradigm holds that there is a direct relationship between 
a sired behavior (high performance) and a desired 
consequence (pay). Taken together, these two theories 
(expectancy th~ory and reinforcement theory) suggest that 
pay can be used to create consequences for desired 
behaviors such as high performance that will in turn 
r~inforce the behaviors (Perry, Mesch, &Paarlberg, 2006) 
Supporters of performance pay frequently use these 
s e causal arguments to advance the idea of performance-
sed compensation. Taking the business world as an 
example, as businesses incentivize production or sales 
through higher pay, workers and sales persons put out more 
ef or innovation which yields increased results. 
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S larly, the thinking goes that by inc~ntivizing quality 
teaching through higher pay you can expect to see greater 
ef rt or innovation on the part of and greater 
achievement from students. 
This framework thinking about how and if money can 
mot teachers was dealt a serious blow with the release 
of Vanderbilt POINT study (Springer et ., 2010). The 
POINT study was an experimental approach igned to 
if a pure ca r improved test scores model of 
formance pay could generate improvements in student 
achievement results as measured through -added. 
Conducted in the public schools in Nashvil , Tennessee, 
POINT offered bonuses of up to $15,000 if middle school 
teachers in the rimental group could get high 
I value added gains their students in comparison 
with teachers in a cont group. After 3 years of study, 
results from POINT indicated only very slight and 
conditional differences between the two groups. 
Summarizing the results in a press release, the authors of 
POINT study concluded "If teachers know they will be 
rewarded for an increase in their students' test scores, 
will test scores go up? We found that the answer to that 
ion is no" (Nati Center on Performance Incentives, 
2010) . 
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These behavioristic/economic approaches to teacher 
motivat and response to 1 incentives hinges on a 
change in effort and approach to teaching as a re t of 
being offered an incentive. If this model is true, then it 
must also be assumed that teachers inherently have the 
knowledge and ability to be r educators for students, 
but have been holding back and wa ing for the right set of 
ives before they do 
so, Perry, Engbers, 
ir best for kids. 
Yun Sun (2009) point out 
that the behavioristic/economic model may have 
complications when applied to a public sector field Ii 
education. Two other intertwined and competing theories 
that teachers are emerge which confound the 
primarily by the economic fluences in expectancy theory 
and the behaviorist influences reinforcement theory. 
Building on the thinking Perry, Engbers, and Yun 
Sun and standing in opposit to the 
behavioristic/economic psychological paradigm is what I 
I the altruistic/PSM (Publ 
gm. This opposing 
arly some types 
Service Motivation) 
k holds that people, 
- like teachers - are 
actually motivated to help others and to accomplish some 
vision or goal than personal financial reward. 
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to the altruistic/PSM approach is self 
determination theory (Deci & Ryan, 2004). S f 
determination theory holds that individuals are mot 
not by extrinsic rewards or punishments, but by 
to their own outcomes and by a desire to take 
some activity because it is int ly 
rewarding, interesting, and satisfying. This theory holds 
r than an extrinsic reward (like ) , 
individuals are primarily motivated by the need for 
competence (in this sense the need to be qualified 
e at a specific job and able to cont 
environment and predict outcomes), the need for autonomy 
f-determination), and the need for relatedness to 
care and be related to others socially). 
and futurist Daniel Pink built on Deci and 
Ryan's sf-determination theory in his popular work Drive: 
e sing Truth about What Motivates Us (2009). Pink 
re and Ryan's work into three areas: Autonomy 
or freedom to direct our own liv~s; Mastery - the 
desire to better at meaningful work; and Purpose the 
des to work in service of something larger than 
s. Pink argues that performance pay approaches are 
t short term or in getting simple tasks 
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complete, but they can ly be counter-productive when 
it comes to complex and creative tasks~ like teaching. 
Public Service Motivation theory argues that the 
purpose component Pink's framework is stronger in some 
people than in others. As applied to teachers, PSM theory 
holds that individuals in the public service fields intend 
to and are mot to "do good for others and shape 
well-being of society" & Hondeghem, 2008, p.3). The 
behaviors of these duals are driven by values that 
are grounded in the purpose of the organization for 
which they serve, that individuals engage in 
altruistic behaviors they are willing to sacrifice 
for others without expectation of reciprocal bene s, and 
that these individuals exhibit what Perry and Hondeghem 
call prosocial behaviors, which advances that these 
individuals engage in act ies believed to benefit other 
people or society as a whole. and Hondeghem go on to 
discuss that there is "moral signi cance" and meaning to 
the work these individuals do. Michael Fullan (2008), in 
his work The Six Secrets : What the Best Leaders 
Do to Help Their Organiza ons Survive and Thrive argues 
that a key element to having a successful school (or any 
organization for that matter) is "connecting peers with 
purpose" (p.39). From this, means that great 
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organizational leaders understand that they must engage 
employees moral purpose of the organization and 
their motivation will low. In Fullan's words, the 
organization should rally "around a higher purpose that has 
meaning for individuals as well as the co ectivity" (p. 
49) . 
These two radigms of motivation 
(behavioristic/economic and altruistic/PSM) stand in 
contrast to each other. However, icularly 
teachers, is mounting evidence that the 
altruistic/PSM paradigm has the stronger influence. 
Drawing from Frederick Herzberg's "two-factor" theory 
of human ion (1959), is certainly possible that 
these two competing theories are not mutually exclusive of 
one another. Herzberg argued that there exists a set of 
"motivators" that include achievement, recognition, the 
work self, responsibility, advancement, and growth. 
Along with e motivators, Herzberg argued that there was 
a set "hygiene" factors that include company policy, 
supervision, re ionship with boss, work conditions, 
salary, ionship with peers, and security. Herzberg 
argued that these two sets of factors were both important 
but that the motivators are what primarily drive employee 
motivation. The hygiene factors were necessary and 
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important to establish a level of satisfaction with an 
employees' work and if any of these were absent or 
under served they could act to de-motivate employees and 
undermine morale. However, Herzberg argued that, while 
these hygiene factors were important, they could not serve 
to drive employees to higher performance. Herzberg argued 
that those factors in the motivators category were actually 
what could serve to inspire employees to higher 
performance. 
Herzberg's work serves as a point of unification 
between the behavioristic/economic paradigm and the 
altruistic/PSM paradigm. From Herzberg's theories, it 
should be expected that both paradigms are important to 
teachers in a performance-based pay context. However, the 
altruistic/PSM paradigm should be a stronger motivator. 
What Teacher Motivation Means for Perfor.mance Pay 
The question of what motivates teachers is a 
foundational psychological point to consider as the 
national debate around performance-based compensation 
continues. If teachers are only motivated for altruistic 
reasons, then all performance-based compensation schemes 
are doomed to fail because they are not doing the work for 
the money, therefore an additional incentive will not 
motivate them to work harder or improve. On the other 
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hand, if teachers are motivated by money, as the 
behavioristic framework would lead one to believe, then 
performance-based pay ems are exactly the ght 
approach using the finite resources that schools have 
to dramatically improve ing and rning. Further 
still, a third possibility emerges. What if these two 
competing paradigms are not mutually exclusive of one 
another? That is, what if teachers can be motivated to 
help kids (altruism) and still be incentivized by the right 
set of compensation elements (behaviorism) to change and 
improve? This dissertation attempts to address these 
questions. 
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CHAPTER III 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
Purpose Statement 
The purpose of this study was to use quantitative data 
collected from Eagle County schools in Colorado to 
investigate the relative presence, absence, or coexistence 
of behavioristic/economic and altruistic/PSM paradigms 
terms teacher motivation in a performance-based 
compensation context. This chapter contains information on 
source of data and methods, subjects, instrumentation 
and data collection procedures, and the research questions 
for this study. 
Source of Data and Methods 
A survey design and quantitative methods were used to 
answer the question of teacher motivation the context of 
compensation. The a was collected through an online 
survey of teachers working in Eagle County schools in the 
spring of 2010. This survey was administered to staff 
as part of the required evaluation process for the 5-year 
federal Teacher Incent Fund (TIF) grant the district 
started receiving 2006. The major focus of the required 
evaluation process for this grant was to capture 
information on how teachers' perceptions of performance-
based compensation programs might change over time and how 
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these compensation systems may have affected their approach 
to instruction and professional learning. As Eagle County 
schools' teachers are in a nearly unique condition of 
having worked under a compensation system driven primarily 
by performance and market-based factors for nearly a 
decade, the data collected from them presents a unique 
opportunity to measure motivation of public educators who 
have been exposed to arguably the most aggressive 
implementation a performance-based compensation system 
in the nation. 
As the data this study is quantitative, the methods 
of analysis were quant ive. Specifi ly, I used simple 
descriptive statistical techniques including cross 
tabulations. 
Subjects 
The subjects surveyed were all certi teachers 
working in the district. For ECS, this included Career 
Teachers, who teach 100% of t instructional day, Mentor 
Teachers, who teach 70% of the instructional day and are 
released 30%.of the day for evaluation and instructional 
coaching of other teachers, and Master Teachers, who teach 
30% of the day and are eased the remainder of the 
day for evaluation and instructional adership 
responsibilities for the school. The survey was completed 
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by all types of teachers working in the dist , including 
both elementary and secondary, general education and 
spe I education teachers, instructional core t rs and 
cials teachers (art, music, PE, etc.), and certified 
staff working in supporting roles like couns ors, 
language pathologists, and teachers on special ass s 
from the district. It is notable that the 
system for all these teachers is fundamentally 
pay 
same, 
including both individual and group (building-wide and 
district-wide) reward structures. 
Instrumentation and Data Co11ection Procedures 
Questions for the survey were designed 
outcomes from the Teacher Incentive Fund grant 
s data is a component of the required eva 
included input from district's Director Res 
which 
) and 
and 
Eva ion (who was also the principal investigator of the 
eva process for the federal TIF grant), the 
st ct's Director of Human Resources (myself at that 
), and an outside contracted research and evaluation 
consultant firm. 
After questions were designed and vetted by these 
individuals and checked against the grant outcomes, 
survey was then pre-tested by having a few teachers 
take the survey and provide feedback about the clarity of 
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the questions given their experience. Substantial revision 
was made to the questions and these were then transposed to 
an onl survey instrument. 
Invitations to participate the online survey were 
sent to all teachers in the district the district email 
system and through the district e ctronic news system. 
low-up invitations, which attempted to push up the 
overall number of responses, were sent on three occasions 
over the course of data collection a 24 day period from 
May 4, 2010 through May 28, 2010. 
The survey instrument grouped 80 items together to 
form si~ sets of items, or scales, based on consistent and 
coherent content. These s s are: rmance-Based 
Compensation; Teaching Practices and Views toward Teaching; 
Teacher Evaluation System; Student Assessment; Job 
Satis ion and Support; and School and Professional 
Climate. 
Cronbach's alpha indicates that all but one scale 
demonstrate high internal reliability, ranging from .83 to 
.93. One "Student Assessment," demonstrates 
moderate reliabil y, with a Cronbach's alpha of .69. With 
eight items, s is the shortest scale and, therefore, is 
expected to produce the lowest iability coefficient. 
Reliability is a function the number of items in the 
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scale; that is, the fewer items there are in a scale 
designed to measure a particular concept, the less reliable 
will be the measurement of that concept. 
To preserve confidentiality, the electronic survey 
instrument did not collect usernames, passwords, or 
individual names. While the system did collect the 
Internet Protocol (I.P.) addresses of the respondents, 
because the majority of teachers responded using Eagle 
County schools' internet access (thus all having the same 
I.P. addresses) it was not possible to single out the 
identity of any single respondent. 
While the exact number of staff members for any school 
district which has more than just a very small enrollment 
varies slightly on any given week, counting both full and 
part time teachers, Eagle County Schools employed an 
estimated 471 certified teachers in May of 2010. Of these, 
305 teachers responded to this survey, providing an 
approximate response rate of 65%. Respondents to this 
survey came from schools in the district that participated 
in the performance pay system and had a balance in terms of 
teacher role (career teachers, mentor teachers, master 
teachers, and support teachers) that was representative of 
the district overall. Slightly more elementary teachers 
responded to the survey than proportional to the actual 
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number of elementary teachers working in the district, but 
survey did capture responses from early childhood, 
elementary, middle, and gh school tea as well as 
those working in multi-grade roles. 
Research Questions 
Data from the le County schools evaluation survey 
1 be used to answer the research questions posed 
re ing to the competing theoretical frameworks of the 
a stic/PSM paradigm and the behavio s c/economic 
gm. The specific research questions addressed in 
dissertation are: 
1. To what extent are teachers motivated for 
behavioristic/economic reasons extrinsic 
rewards? 
2. To what extent are teachers motivated for 
altruistic/PSM reasons and intr ic rewards? 
3. To what extent can teachers be simultaneously 
motivated by behavioristic/economic and 
altruistic/PSM means? 
4. To what extent are behaviorist /economic or 
altruistic/PSM motivators more dominant in what 
motivates teachers? 
Table 3 presents these research questions in a matrix 
format, showing the survey data contained in the Eagle 
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County evaluation survey that relate to that cular 
question. As can be seen in Table 3, the Eagle County 
evaluation a contains a number of response ems that 
provide answers to the research questions. Quantitative 
methods in form of desc ive statistical analysis, 
including cross tabulations, will be used to answer the 
research questions. 
Table 3 
Resea Ma 
1. Are 
motivated for 
behavioristic/economic 
reasons and extrinsic 
rewards? 
motivated for 
altruistic/PSM reasons 
and intrinsic rewards? 
motivated both by 
behavioristic/economic 
and altruistic/PSM 
means? 
Are 
behavioristic/economic 
or altruistic/PSM 
motivators more 
dominant in what 
drives teachers? 
Source 
Survey 
Survey 
Survey 
(Survey Questions) 
• A major motivator for 
me is earning more 
money. 
• I have a strong desire 
to earn a raise or a 
bonus. 
• My evaluation is 
important because my 
pay is attached to it. 
• Student assessment 
results are important 
because pay is attached 
to them. 
• I work harder because 
of performance pay. 
• A major motivator for 
me is helping others. 
• My evaluation is 
important because it 
helps me be a better 
teacher for my 
students. 
• Student assessments are 
important because they 
help in guiding 
instruction for my 
students. 
• A major motivator for 
me is earning more 
money. 
• A major motivator for 
me is helping others. 
• More attention is paid 
to evaluations because 
of performance pay. 
• More attention is paid 
to student assessments 
because of performance 
motivator for 
me is earning more 
money. 
• A major motivator for 
me is helping others. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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statistical 
statistical 
Crosstab and 
correlation 
of responses 
from 
altruistic 
and 
behavioristic 
statistical 
Crosstab and 
correlation 
of responses 
from 
altruistic 
and 
behavioristic 
CHAPTER IV 
PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS 
Introduction 
The purpose of this study was to analyze quantitative 
survey data gathered 
County School District 
teachers working in the Eagle 
Colorado and to answer four 
specific questions regarding teacher motivation in a 
pe rmance-based compensation system. More specif 
the study examined: whether teachers were more strongly 
mot ed by a behavioristic/economic paradigm or an 
ly, 
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alt stic/public se motivation paradigm; if they were 
mot by both paradigms simultaneously; and if there 
was evidence that one paradigm was stronger than the other. 
This chapter presents the data and s analysis as re 
to four primary research questions. 
Nature of the Study 
The research subject population for this study 
consisted of public school teachers in 1 grades and 
subject areas working the Eagle County School District 
of Colorado in the spring of 2010. All of the subjects 
were provided an opportunity to parti e in this study 
through responding to an online survey on their opinions 
regarding compensation and measures of educator 
e iveness being utilized in the dist While 
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i actual number of s working in any district j, 
i 
fluctuates slightly through the year, is estimated that 
1 
I the number of both full and part time te rs working in 
Eagle County Schools at the time of s data collection 
was 410. Of these, 278 responded to s survey, providing 
an approximate response rate of 68%. 
Potent 1 respondents received a of four email 
notices delivered the district's work email system with 
instructions on how to complete the survey and a link to 
the online data collector. Questions on the survey were 
divided into sections. The rst section asked basic 
demographic, job cement, and experience questions. The 
second se on asked Likert scaled questions on opinions of 
and support for performance-based compensation. The third 
section asked a series of questions on perceived degree 
of impact performance-based compensation had on respondent 
teaching. The fourth section contai Likert scaled 
questions on support for the district's teacher evaluation 
system (used to ermine annual rai~es) and support for 
the district's assessment system (used to determine annual 
raises). The st section contained stions about job 
satisfaction and perceived levels of pro sional support. 
Respondents were so provided the opportunity to give 
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qual ative responses a open text options scattered 
throughout the ent survey. 
Presentation and Analysis of Findings 
All data collection took place in spring of 2010, 
lly in the months of February and March. This 
t was specifically and intentionally chosen so as not to 
be immediately after teachers returned winter break 
and not to be too near the end of the school year; both of 
which are considered ic times for teaching staff. 
Table 4 presents career specific and demographic 
information from the survey so that we have a better 
of how representat information is. ECS uses a 
modified version Teacher Advancement Program 
p sional development/professional learning community 
system and career path model for its teachers. This 
program allows for , Mentor, and Master teacher roles 
in schools. Career rs teach 100% day and make 
up majority of the teacher workforce. Mentor teachers 
70% of the day and are freed up 30% of the day to 
coach and serve in a mentoring role to other teachers. 
Master teachers teach 30% of the day and are freed up the 
other 70% to evaluate and coach other te and to serve 
as ional leaders their buildings. 
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Table 4 
Career and Demographic 
Variable 
Statistics 
N Percentage 
Teacher Role 
Career Teacher 

Mentor Teacher 

Master Teacher 

Specialist 

Grade Level 
Early Childhood 
Elementary 
Middle School 
High School 
Multiple 
Experience 
1 or less 
2-3 years 
4 5 years 
6-8 years 
9-12 years 
13-16 years 
17-20 years 
21-25 years 
26 or more years 
Highest Degree 
BA 
MA 
PhD (or other terminal) 
Gender 
Male 
Mentor and Master teachers 
180 63.4 
51 18.0 
24 8.5 

29 10.2 

4 1.4 
162 56.3 
49 17.0 
66 22.9 
7' 2.4 
11 4.4 
20 7.9 
24 9.5 

29 11. 5 

62 24.6 

36 14.3 

15 5.6 

31 12.3 

24 9.5 
120 42.4 
160 56.5 
3 1.1 
49 17.6 

229 82.4 

received a $5,000 and $11,500 
salary addition re ively in the 2009-2010 school year 
in ECS. The data col cted in this study ed that 
63.4% of respondents were Career Teachers, 18% were Mentor 
Teachers, 8.5% were Master Teachers, and 10.2% were 
I 

1 

1, 
! 
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specialist teachers of various kinds (media teachers,J 
speech language pathologists, instructional coaches, etc.) . 
I
• These numbers match clo y the proportions of these 
teacher roles that exist in overall population of 
teachers in the district. We also see that a majority 
respondents were elementary teachers (56.3%) with sser 
numbers of middle school teachers (17.0%), high school 
teachers (22.9%), and teachers in multiple grade settings 
(2.4%). From this, we know that elementary school teachers 
were over-represented in the sample whereas middle school 
teachers were under-represented related to the population 
of teachers in ECS. These differences from the sample to 
the population were not dramatic. Looking at those ors 
which are traditionally associated with the way y all 
teachers in the Unit States are compensated ( rience 
and education 1), Eagle County was found to have a 
broad spread of teacher experience levels with a plurality 
responding teachers having between 9-12 years of 
experience. Master's degrees were held by 56.5% of ECS 
teachers whi 42.4% held a bachelor's degree, and 1.1% 
held a doctorate or some other terminal degree. These 
stat ics do not put ECS respondents far from the 
orado average of 54% of teachers holding a master's 
degree or above (Roza & Miller, 2009). Most respondents to 
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the ECS survey were Ie at 82.4%, though this is not 
particularly disproportionate from the overall ECS teacher 
workforce, which is also predominantly female. 
I Overall, these career and demographic numbers suggest 
a good sampling of strict's workforce and 
there the results can be generaliz to the gene 
population of ECS t rs. While there are certainly 
generalizability issues when using point time data 
colle on from one district, this is not believed to be a 
cause of concern for present study. 
Research Question 1: The Behavioristic/Economic Paradigm 
In their literature review on the theoretical, 
psychological underpinnings of performance-based 
compensation, Perry, Engbers, and Yun Jun (2009) put forth 
two rtwined ideas set up the 
behavioristic/extrinsic paradigm. 
rst, expectancy the6ry holds behaviors will 
change to meet the s to which desi outcomes are 
attached. Second, reinforcement theory indicates there is 
a direct relationship between behavior and consequence. 
More cific to the economic context of performance-based 
compensation, Vroom and MacCrimmon (1968) put forth that 
employees will work r for financi rewards. 
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Together, these ideas form the foundation of the 
behavioristic/economic paradigm. 
Table 5 presents the results from the Eagle County 
Schools survey data from five survey questions that 
directly address the presence of the behavioristic/economic 
paradigm as it relates to educator motivation. 
kert scaled responses to the prompt, nI have a 
strong desire to earn a raise or bonus," revealed that 
26.9% strongly agreed with the statement and 50.6% agreed. 
Comparatively, 17.6% disagreed and only 4.9% strongly 
disagreed with this statement. Aggregating the agree 
results together for this question shows 77.5% of 
respondents e strongly agreed or agreed with 
prompt, I have a strong desire to earn a raise or bonus. 
It is important to keep the Eagle County schools 
context in mind when interpreting these results. As this 
is a school system which has completely abandoned the 
traditional st and lane pay system, ses are earned by 
evaluation scores and bonuses are earned through an index 
of student achievement results. These data clearly show 
that a large majority of the respondents from Eagle County 
desire to earn a raise or bonus. The results satisfy, at 
least in part, an aspect of the behavioristic/economic 
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paradigm in that we see that the large majority of teachers 
do want the incentive. 
Table 5 
Evidence of Behavioristic/Economic gm Percentage 
Str. Str. 
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree 
I have a 
raise or 
strong desire 
bonus. 
to earn a 26.9 50.6 17.6 4.9 
A or 
earning 
motivator for 
more money. 
me is 15.2 35.9 34.2 14.7 
My evaluation is important 
because pay is attached to it. 
22.0 37.8 30.3 10.0 
Student assessments are 
important because pay is 
attached to them. 
9.5 38.8 36.6 15.1 
I work harder because of 
performance pay. 
7.2 26.5 52.6 13.7 
Responses to the prompt, a major motivator for me is 
earning more money, reveals somewhat ss support for 
behavioristic/economic paradigm. Results are fairly evenly 
spl on the agree/disagree side of this question, with 
15.2% strongly agreeing and 35.9% agreeing, but 34.2% 
disagreeing and 14.7% strongly disagreeing. Aggregating 
these results together, 51.1% of respondents were in some 
level of agreement while 49.9% were in some level of 
disagreement. 
, 
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Interpreting these results along with responses to 
1 
the previous question, it is inferred while teachersi 
1 do seem to want the financial rewards of bonuses or raises,I 
I 
~ 
I 
this data suggests these are not major motivators for them. 
1 
4 
1, 
Again keeping context mind, is important to
1 
I 
~ 
remember that raises in Eagle County schools are determined 
by evaluation scores. The behavioristic/economic paradigm~ 
1 
I would predict that teachers would place greater importancei 
i to evaluation scores because of this association. This isI 
I at least partially validated by the respondent results to 
t the prompt ~My evaluation is important because pay isI 
1 
attached to it." 22% respondents strongly agreed withJ 
1 this statement and 37.8% agreed, totaling 59.8% in someI 
I level of agreement with the prompt. Opposing this were 
I 30.3% teachers who said they disagreed with the j 
~ 
I statement and 10% who strongly disagreed, totaling 40.3% on 
1 
i the disagree side of statement. The results from this data indicate some support for the behavioristic/economic 
I paradigm as 59.8% of respondents indicated the evaluation 
was important because pay was attached to it and the 
1 largest response group fell in the ~agree" category withi 
i 37.8%. 
J 
! Eagle County Schools' teachers also get an annual 
i 
1 
bonus paid on an index of student assessment results. This1 1 
i 
I 
j 
I 
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index is calculated at both the building and district 
level, so the employees have ss direct influence over it 
in comparison with their evaluation scores, which are 
individualized to each employee. The last question on 
table 5 addresses this student achievement to pay bonus 
link. 
When asked how they agreed with the statement "Student 
assessments are important because pay is attached to them," 
respondents' results were mixed, with slightly more 
disagreeing with statement. 9.5% of respondents 
strongly agreed and 38.8% agreed. Conversely, 36.6% 
disagreed and 15.1% strongly disagreed. Aggregating the 
disagreement results together, a maj y of respondents 
disagreed with the statement "Student assessments are 
important because pay is attached to them." 
Interpreting the question on table 5 gets to the 
heart of a central underpinning the 
behavioristic/economic paradigm on which the expectancy 
theory is ba Again, expectancy theory holds that 
behavior will change to meet the desired incentive. 
Responses to the prompt "I work harder because of 
rformance pay" call this into question. Only 7.2% of 
respondents strongly agreed wi this prompt and 26.5% 
agreed. Conversely, 52.6% disagreed and 13.7% strongly 
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disagreed. Totaling these, only 33.7% of respondents were 
on the agree side of this statement in compa son with 
66.7% who were in some level of disagreement with the 
prompt. As a central underpinning of the 
behavioristic/economic ~aradigm is behaviors would 
change in pursuit of the desired incentive, we see limited 
support for this not as respondents did not agree with 
the statement that they worked harder because of 
performance pay. 
Still, some conditional support the 
behavioristic/economic paradigm is revealed by the results. 
In looking at the responses that related to the importance 
of assessments and the responses to the importance of 
evaluation scores because pay is linked to them, 
conditional support was found the 
behavioristic/economic paradigm. However, s support may 
have been determined by how closely tied individual was 
to the measure (respondents are individually linked to 
evaluation scores and are linked by building to assessment 
results) . 
In sum, data reveals conditional support the 
behavioristic/economic paradigm. It appears that most 
teachers in Eagle County schools do in fact have a strong 
desire to earn a raise or bonus and they place greater 
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importance on those measures are most closely 
individualized to each teacher. However, teachers do not 
r to be primarily motivat by money, and a strong 
maj y indicated they did not wo harder because of 
performance pay. 
From this, it is inferred , while there is some 
of the behavioristic/economic paradigm at play in 
question of what motivates teachers, financial 
s are not their primary motivators, so the 
ed behavior change in response to incentives that 
behavioristic/economic pa gm predicts might not be 
seen. As Perry, Engbers, and Yun Sun (2009) indicated, 
re are a number of complicating factors at work in 
r motivation that may create issues with implementing 
performance pay schemes built on behavioristic/economic 
theoretical underpinnings. 
Research Question 2: The A2truistic/PSM Paradigm 
Standing in oppos ion to the behavioristic/economic 
gm is the altruistic/PSM paradigm. This framework 
holds that public service s (like teachers) are 
more motivated to help and to work in service of a 
larger goal or vision than to seek personal or extrins 
rewards. 
I
•j 
~ 
I 
I 
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Drawing heavily on Deci and Ryan's sel rmination 
theory (2004) and Perry and Hondegem's (2008) public 
service motivation theory, the altruistic/PSM paradigm 
predicts that teachers will be most strongly motivated by 
the desire to help others. 
Table 6 presents the results from the Eagle County 
schools survey data the three survey questions that 
directly address presence of the altruistic/PSM 
paradigm as it relates to educator motivation. 
Table 6 
Evidence of the Altruistic/PSM Paradigm Percentage 
Str. Str. 
A major motivator for 
is helping others. 
me 73.4 26.6 0.0 0.0 
My evaluation is important 
because it helps me be 
better teacher for my 
students. 
a 
35.7 46.9 13.3 4.2 
Student assessments are 
important because they 
help guiding 
instruction for my 
students. 
42.2 49.8 5.9 2.1 
kert-scaled responses to the prompt "A major 
motivator me is helping others," resul in strong 
evidence of the altruistic/PSM paradigm. A clear majority 
69 
(73.4%) of responding teachers indicated they strongly 
agreed with this statement and 26.6% indicated that they 
were in agreement with the statement. All told, every 
educator who responded to this survey indicated they were 
in some level of agreement with the prompt. 
Table 5 shows how important teachers felt evaluation 
and assessment results were because pay was attached to 
them. In Table 6, questions are displayed showing how 
important teachers feel evaluations and assessment results 
are to helping students. 
For evaluations, 35.7% of respondents strongly agreed 
and 46.9% agreed with the prompt that evaluations were 
important because they made teachers be better for their 
students. Only 13.3% disagreed and only 4.2% strongly 
disagreed. In total, 82.6% agreed with the statement. 
The altruistic/PSM motivations came through even more 
strongly on the assessment results. When teachers were 
asked if student assessments were important because they 
help in guiding instruction for students, 42.2% strongly 
agreed with the prompt and 49.8% agreed. Only 5.9% 
disagreed and 2.1% strongly disagreed. In total, 92% of 
teachers agreed or strongly agreed with the prompt, while 
only 8% disagreed or strongly disagreed. 
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The survey data (see Table 6) serves as strong 
evidence to support the altruistic/PSM pa gm. That is, 
the data suggests that teachers are strongly motivated to 
help others and are especially mot to help their 
students. These re s confirm, at part, what 
the altruistic/PSM paradigm would predict. 
Research Questions 3 & 4: S~ultaneity and Strength of 

Behavioristic/Economic and Altruistic/PSM MOtivation 

While the gmsof the behavioristic/economic view 
and the altruist /PSM view are compet theories of what 
motivates teachers, another possibil y is that the two 
paradigms are not mutually exclusive. More specifically in 
the case of rformance pay discuss , can teachers be 
motivated for money and be motivated to lp others. 
Research question 3 specifically asks if se paradigms 
can exist simultaneously. 
It also may be the case that even if these paradigms 
exist simultaneously, one may be more dominant (or 
stronger) than the other. Research question 4 asks whether 
or not one of these paradigms is stronger than the other 
the teachers surveyed. 
The resu s to research question 3 and research 
question 4 are presented simultaneous because the 
questions are intertwined. In looking at whether the 
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behavioristic/economic and the altruist /PSM paradigms 
exist simultaneously, we can also investigate the relative 
strength of the radigms in comparison with other. 
Table 7 presents a cross tabulation of s to 
two survey questions. One question asked rs if a 
major motivator them was helping others (the 
altruistic/PSM pa gm). The other question asked if a 
major motivator was earning more money (the 
behaviorisitc/economic paradigm). The results are 
displayed in Table 7: 
Table 7 
A Cross Tabulation of Behavioristic/Economic and 
for me others.is 
A major motivator N Counts 
for me is earning Strongly 
more e Row Totals 
Strongly Agree 27 7 34 
Agree 61 22 83 
Disagree 51 27 78 
Column Totals 
29 5 34 

168 61 229 

Table 7 clearly shows that a major motivator for 
teachers is helping rs and this finding lends more 
support to the stic/PSM paradigm. One hundred 
percent of the teachers were in some level of agreement 
with this statement and 73% of them (168 of 229) strongly 
agreed with 
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The behavio stic/economic paradigm also sees some 
support among the respondents, though to a sser 
Fifty two of teachers said they were some level 
of agreement with the statement that a major mot or 
them was more money, while 4'8% were in some 
of disagreement with the statement. Most responses (67%) 
centered in middle of the Likert scale (on eit r agree 
or di , but not in the "strongly" categor s). 
The ion in Table 7 provides some insight to 
research ion 3, as it shows some evidence 
behavioristic/economic paradigm and the altruistic/PSM 
paradigms are not mutually exclusive. Whi the 
in support the behavioristic/economic paradigm is 
clearly not as strong as the altruistic/PSM paradigm (a 
point which 1 be addressed in research question 4) these 
results show the two are not mutually exclusive. 
While all t rs appear to be strongly motivated to help 
others, more half of them are motivated to earn more 
money, also. From s, we can draw an inference that the 
two competing s are not mutually exclusive. 
Research stion 4 asked which of these competing 
paradigms had a stronger influence on motivating teachers. 
The data (see e 7) clearly shows that the 
altruistic/PSM gm is dominant in driving motivation 
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for teachers with 100% of them agreeing that helping others 
is a major motivator for them. However, presence of 
the altruistic/PSM paradigm does not extend to the point 
that the behavioristic/economic paradigm cannot coexist, 
though the behavioristic/economic paradigm clearly has less 
influence. 
While results clearly show altruistic/PSM 
paradigm is dominant in terms of strength in motivating 
teachers (see 7), the question of strength of the 
financial was examined a more nuanced way (see 
Table 8). In County schools, evaluation scores 
determine ses and student assessment ts determine 
annual bonuses. These two compensation sms are 
clearly built the behavioristic/economic paradigm in 
mind. Table 8 illustrates the strength this paradigm may 
have to attract attention of teachers to those things 
to which the financial incentive is 
When were asked to rate ir level of 
agreement with statement, "I pay more attention to my 
evaluation cause my pay is attached to ," 77.2% of 
respondents ei strongly agreed or with the 
statement versus 22.7% which were in some 1 of 
disagreement (see Table 8). 
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When asked their level of agreement with the statement 
~I pay more attention to student achievement results 
because pay is attached to it," 71% of respondents were in 
some level of agreement with the statement versus 29.1% in 
some level of sagreement. 
Table 8 
Attention Focusing Aspect of Compensation Percentage 
Str. Str. 
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree 
I pay more attention to 37.3 39.9 16.3 6.4 
my uation because pay 
is attached to 
I pay more attention to 26.1 44.9 21.8 7.3 
student achievement 
results because pay is 
attached to them. 
These results show evidence of 
behavioristic/economic paradigm at work. 
is clearly linked to evaluation (as it is 
Schools in the form of annual raises) nea 
educators say they pay more attention to 
When pay is linked to student achievement 
the 
When educator pay 
Eagle County 
y 8 in 10 
the eva ion. 
re s (as it is 
in Eagle County Schools the form annual bonuses) over 
7 10 educators say they pay more attention to student 
achievement results. 
From this, we can 
economic paradigm does 
infer that behavioristic/ 
have capacity to draw the 
I 

1 
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1 attention of educ~tors to those measures to which the 
I reward is attached. This is in line with the theoretical 
t 
aspects of the behavioris c/economic paradigm that predict 
that people are attracted to rewards which they want to 
i j receive. In this case, the attention of educators is 
l attracted to their evaluation and assessment results. 
1 
These findings suggest the presence of both the 
I 
altruistic/PSM and the behavioristic/economic paradigms at 
work in educator motivation. 
I Teachers are strong motivated to help others and are 
1 particularly motivated to help their students succeed.j 
i Teachers are also motivated to earn more money, but this 
I appears to be a secondary drive to the main motivations of 
a ruism and public service. Further, the motivating 
influence of the behavioristic/economic paradigm seems to 
weaken when it comes to predicting actual behavior changes 
in teachers working harder to achieve raises or bonuses. 
The evidence presented here so suggests that these 
paradigms are not mutually exclusive. That is, from s 
analysis it does not appear to be the case that teachers 
are exclusively motivated by only altruistic/PSM factors or 
behavioris c/economic factors. Rather, there is often a 
blending of these two paradigms at work amongst educators, 
76 
though the altruistic/PSM paradigm appears to be the more 
dominant of the two. 
While the altiuistic/PSM paradigm certainly appears to 
be the stronger of two frameworks, the re ts of 
s study suggest that, while the power of 
behavioristic/economic gm appears to be more limited, 
we do see evidence of a behavior change response to the 
financial incentive through the attraction of the attention 
of the educators to those measures which compensation is 
attached. 
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CHAPTER V 

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

Introducti.on 

The purpose of this study was to investi 
competing motivational views of the behaviorist /economic 
paradigm and the altruistic/PSM paradigm in context of 
a performance-based compensation program. r I 
presented a broad overview of the concept of 
based compensation, educator motivation, and unique 
place Eagle County schools holds in the development of 
performance-based compensation systems. 
contained a literature review of the research surrounding 
performance-based compensation and the res on 
foundational theoretical underpinnings of 
behavioristic/economic and altruistic/PSM paradigms. 
Chapter III contained a description of the data used in 
s study, the specific research questions addressed by 
study, and the methodology used to evaluate the data 
light of the research questions. Chapter IV ~ontained an 
analysis of the data from the Eagle County Schools survey. 
Chapter V offers a summary, conclusion, and recommendat s 
policy, practice, and future research. 
Four research questions were asked: (a) Are 
motivated for behavioristic/economic reasons and extrins 
II 
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rewards? (b) Are teachers motivated for altruistic/PSM 
reasons and intrinsic rewards? (c) Can teachers be 
simultaneously motivated both by behavioristic/economic and 
altruistic/PSM means? and (d) Are behavioristic/economic or 
altruistic/PSM motivators more dominant in what drives 
teachers? 
Quantitative survey data gathered from teachers 
working in the Eagle County school district in Colorado 
during the spring of 2010 was used in order to answer the 
four research questions. 
Research question 1 was: Are teachers motivated for 
behavioristic/economic reasons and extrinsic rewards? 
Perry, Engbers, and Yun Jun (2009) wrote that there are 
intertwined ideas that set up the behavioristic/extrinsic 
paradigm: expectancy theory and reinforcement theory. 
Expectancy theory holds that behaviors will change to meet 
the goals to which desired outcomes are attached. 
Reinforcement theory indicates there is a direct 
relationship between behavior and consequence. More 
directly related to the economic context of performance-
based compensation, Vroom and MacCrimmon (1968) put forth 
that employees will work harder for financial rewards. 
The evidence presented in this research suggests 
conditional support for the behavioristic/economic 
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paradigm. Teachers do appear to desire to earn more money, 
satisfying at least one condition of expectancy theory; 
that the employees are offered something that they desire 
in more money. However, the second component - that 
teachers' behavior would change in pursuit of the money ­
is not cleaLly supported by the data presented in this 
study. The evidence does not indicate that teachers will 
work harder because of being in a performance pay system. 
Research question 2 was: Are teachers motivated for 
altruistic/PSM reasons and intrinsic rewards? This 
research question was intended to closely investigate Deci 
and Ryan's (2004) self determination theory and Perry and 
Hongdegem's (2008) public service motivation theory, which 
are at the core of what I have called the altruistic/PSM 
paradigm. 
The evidence presented in this study suggests strong 
support for the altruistic/PSM paradigm in those questions 
which asked if helping others was a major motivator and 
questions about the importance of evaluations and student 
assessments because they help teachers better serve 
students. The data clearly showed the presence of this 
altruistic/PSM motivation paradigm in these responses. 
Teachers seem more interested in outcomes that help others 
(the relatedness aspects of Deci and Ryan's (2004) self­
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determination theory) and the connection to a higher 
purpose predicted by public service motivation theory and 
Fullan's (2008) "connecting peers with purpose" (p.39). 
Resea question 3 was: Can be 
simu ly motivated both by behavioristic/economic and 
altruistic/PSM means? More speci cally, this study sought 
to invest e if the concepts unde ying the 
behaviori c/economic paradigm and altruistic/PSM 
paradigm were mutually exclusive of one another. 
ck Herzberg (1959) po a theoretical model 
suggesting that these competing paradigms need not be 
mutually usive and that they serve different roles for 
employees. behavioristic/economic paradigm would fall 
in Herzberg's hygiene factors and would be useful in 
establishing a.base of employee satisfaction. The 
altruistic/PSM paradigm would fall Herzberg's 
motivational factors, which Herzberg held had the capacity 
to mot employees toward higher rformance. 
The evidence presepted in s study suggests that, in 
many , these paradigms do st and that teachers 
can be simultaneously motivated by desire to earn more 
money and to help others. Teachers are rational beings who 
desire nancial incentives. Teachers are also 
intrinsi ly motivated beings who want to help others, 
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particularly their students. This study shows that these 
two competing paradigms can co-exist. 
Research question 4 was: Are behavioristic/economic or 
altruistic/PSM motivators more dominant in what drives 
teachers? This research question looked at matters of 
degree in both paradigms to determine which one seemed to 
have the stronger pull on educators. 
The evidence presented in this study suggests that 
teachers are primarily driven to help others and thus the 
psychological underpinnings of Deci and Ryan's (2004) self-
determination theory and Perry and Hongdegem's (2008) 
public service motivation theory are supported. Also, the 
evidence shows that while the presence of the 
altruistic/PSM paradigm is more dominant, there is also 
evidence (albeit weaker) of the behavioristic/economic 
paradigm predicted by expectancy theory and behaviorism. 
The evidence presented in this study also shows that 
while the behavioristic/economic paradigm is the weaker of 
the two paradigms, it does appear to have the ability to 
draw the attention of the educators to those measures to 
which a financial incentive is attached. 
Conclusions 
The purpose of this study was to investigate the 

influence of the behavioristic/economic and altruistic/PSM 
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paradigms in educator motivation in the context of a 
performance-based compensation system. The study used data 
from a survey of teachers in Eagle County schools in 
Colorado, a district with arguably the longest and most 
aggressive history of using performance-based compensation 
in the United States. 
The study suggests that both paradigms are at work in 
motivating teachers and that it is possible for the 
paradigms to coexist. Comparing the relative influence of 
the two, the altruistic/PSM paradigm appears to have a 
stronger effect than the behavioristic/economic paradigm. 
However, the behavioristic/economic paradigm does appear to 
have the ability to draw the attention of educators to 
those measures to which an incentive is attached. 
A few weeks before the completion of the writing in 
this study, economist Roland Fryer (2011) published a 
working paper from the National Bureau of Economic Research 
that presented his findings in a study of a cash-for-test­
scores performance pay plan piloted in New York City public 
schools. The results showed a negligible effect on a 
number of student performance outcomes measured in the 
study, including measures of student achievement. This 
study falls quickly on the heels of the Vanderbilt POINT 
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experiment (Springer et al., 2010) whi showed a similar 
lack of results. 
Fryer's results and the res of POINT 
experiment fairly c rly show ca est-scores 
schemes do not seem to be effective sing student 
achievement beyond the tradit step approach. 
This study suggests possible reasons why. Simple cash-for­
test-scores schemes rely on a purely stic/economic 
paradigm when in reality teachers are more strongly 
motivated for altruistic and public se ce reasons. As 
Herzberg (1959) predicted, the results of s study 
suggest that while financial incentives an important 
place in establishing employee satisfaction, they play a 
limited role in motivation. This s especially so 
among teachers. 
Simplistic performance pay models as those tested 
in Fryer's study and the POINT study y on a basic 
psychological mechanism that would us believe that 
when presented with the set s, teachers 
will have nearly a purely behavioral pursuit of 
the money and alter teaching practices Is of effort 
to reach those incentives and student will se 
as a consequence. The fact that are more strongly 
motivated to help others and to be to a larger 
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and important public service effort clouds ability of 
simple cash-for-test-scores approaches to drive student 
achievement. 
While this studY answers, in part, why simplistic 
performance pay systems may fail in altering teacher 
behavior and ultimately changing student learning, it is 
important to note that this study did note that educators 
are attracted and pay attention to financial incentives. 
One need look no further t,han the number of educators who 
pursue advanced degree credits to gain a lane change on the 
traditional pay system for more evidence that teachers 
respond to financial incentives. Policy makers, 
practitioners, and researchers would all be best served to 
continue experimentation with performance based 
compensation systems, rather than accept that experience 
and education credits are the only way to compensate 
teachers. However, the design, implementation, and study 
of these new compensation models should take into account 
teacher motivation as a key element for consideration. 
Policy Recommendations 
1. 	Avoid mandating simple cash-for-test-scores models of 
performance pay. 
2. 	Support the creation of compensation models that assume 
teachers are motivated by both altruistic/PSM reasons and 
I 

j 85 
j 
I 
~ 	 behavioristic/economic reasons and take into account 
I 
1 
Herzberg's (1959)two factor model in design. 
3. 	Support further experimentation with performance pay1 
models and how the a1truistic/PSM and1 
I 
~• behavioristic/economic paradigms may affect the responses 
I to these experiments.j 
4. 	Provide supports to educators around those things toI 
I which compensation is attached, so that the attention of 
educators can be used as a tool that is linked to 
improvement. 
5. 	Support the design of compensation systems that build on 
the potential synergy of the behavioristic/economic and 
the altruistic/PSM paradigms. 
Practice Recommendations 
1. 	Use the underlying altruistic/PSM motivations in teachers 
as the primary mechanism by which to drive improvement in 
practice and ultimately better outcomes for students. 
2. 	Design sophisticated compensation systems that move 
beyond the traditional step and lane models but also 
beyond simple cash-for-test-scores approaches. 
3. 	Motivate teachers by connecting their work to the moral 
purpose and social significance of education, while 
incentivizing those outcomes and measures most closely 
associated with student achievement. 
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4. 	Provide significant supports that drive improvement 
alongside those measures used a performance pay model. 
5. 	Pay significant at tent to making sure that those 
measures to which compens on is attached are valid and 
reliable and are clearly linked to quality outcomes for 
students. 
6. 	Design systems with understanding that teachers will 
be most attentive to measures that are individually 
attached to each te 
Future Research Recommendations 
1. 	Design sophisticated and s ifically sound (valid and 
reliable) measures of mot ion and examine how 
educators respond to f al incentives and 
altruistic/public se ce motivators. 
2. 	Study the diversity compensation approaches that exist 
beyond purely performance payor purely the traditional 
step and lane approach. 
3. 	Design studies to measure possible synergistic or 
additive effects that may emerge as more comprehens 
compensation and support mechanisms appear. 
4. 	Investigate holistic human capital systems that consider 
compensation as one element in a larger system of 
improving the human resources in an organization along 
I
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J 	
with recruitment, hiring, induction, ongoing supports, 
professional development, and select retentJ 
I 5. Observe and 	study if specific behavior changes occur asI 
1 
I the result of financial incentives and determine if these 
~ 
I 	 behavior changes are theoretically or empirically linked 
to student achievement.I 
6. Conduct a qualitative study relating to why1 
I, 
altruistic/PSM 	motivators are more prevalent ini 
I 
i 
educators. This study should include investigatingi j issues such as calling of the ssion and the 
1 reasons individuals become teachers. 
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APPENDIX 

ECS SURVEY QUESTIONS 

KEY 
• = a question prompt. 
• = a response option. 

~ a question stemming from a prompt. 

• In what school do you teach the majority of the time? 
• Red Table Early Learning Center 
• Red Sandstone Elementary 
• Meadow Mountain Elementary 
• Avon Elementary 
• Edwards Elementary 
• June Creek Elementary 
• Valley Elementary 
• Brush Creek Elementary 
• Gypsum Elementary 
• Red Hill Elementary 
• Minturn Middle School 
• Berry Creek Middle School 
• Eagle Valley Middle School 
• Gypsum Creek Middle School 
• Battle Mountain High School 
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• 	 Eagle ley High School 
• 	 Red Canyon High School 
• 	 Vail S & Snowboard Academy 
• 	 In what do you teach? 
• 	 Career 
• 	 Mentor Teacher 
• 	 Master Teacher 
• 	 Specialist 
• 	 What grade level best fits who you teach? 
• 	 Early Childhood 
• 	 Elementary 
• 	 Middle School 
• 	 High School 
• 	 Multiple Grades 
• 	 Including s school year and adding up part time 
years, how many years have you taught on a full-time 
basis? In County Schools? In Your Total 
Teaching Career? 
• 	 1 Year or Less 
• 	 2 to 3 Years 
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• 4 to 5 Years 
• 6 to 8 Years 
! • 9 to 12 Years 
i 
II 
i 
• 
• 
13 
17 
to 
to 
16 
20 
Years 
Years 
j;
1 • 
21 to 25 Years 
1 
! 
• 26 Years or More 
I1 
! • What is your highest degree earned? 
J 
i 
i 
I 
I 
I 
.j 
.1 
• 
• 
Bachelor's Degree 
Master's Degree 
i 
~ j
i 
• Doctorate or Professional Degree 
• What is your gender? 
• Female 
• Male 
• What is your race or ethnicity? 
• White/Caucasian 
• Hispanic/Latino 
• Black/African American 
• Asian/Pacific Islander 
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• 	 Other 
• 	 None of these apply/Don't want to answer 
• 	 To what extent do you agree with the following 
statements? 
• 	 Strongly Agree 
• 	 Agree 
• 	 Disagree 
• 	 Strongly Disagree 
• 	 Don't Know 
~ I understand how performance pay works at ECS. 
~ I believe that the method for determining pay is 
fair. 
~ I can earn more on performance pay than on a regular 
pay system. 
~ I believe that the district is committed to making 
the performance pay system better. 
~ I feel I am adequately compensated r what I do as 
a teacher. 
~ I seek out more professional development because of 
performance pay. 
~ I work harder because of pe pay. 
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~ I am more reflective because of rformance pay. 
~ I have a strong desire to earn a raise or bonus. 
~ There is enough money offered to motivate me. 
~ Performance pay increases col on between 
teachers. 
~ Performance pay increases compet ion between 
teachers. 
~ Teachers high poverty schools should be paid 
more. 
~ Teachers shortage areas (like math, special 
education) should be paid more. 
~ I would r the traditional and level pay 
system. 
~ Performance pay makes teachers at ECS less willing 
to teach low income or minority students. 
~ I 1 I am better rewarded financially because 
performance pay. 
~ I ly support the performance pay system at 
ECS. 
• Has the opportunity to rece additional financial 
rewards or bonuses for effect performance changed 
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the way you view your job or your teaching practices? 
Please rate the level of impact in each area. 
• Strong Impact 
• Moderate Impact 
• Little Impact 

!II No Impact 

• Don't Know 
> I am being appreciated more for the work I do. 
> I can earn more on performance pay than on a regular 
pay system. 
> I feel my job is more rewarding. I am happier with 
my teaching experience. 
> I am more enthusiastic about teaching. 
> I am more focused on improving my teaching. 
> I am more focused on student achievement ga 
> I spend more time in professional development 
act s. 
> I spend more time providing supplemental se s or 
tutoring to students. 
> I spend more time aligning my instruction to 
standards evaluation rubric. 
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~ 	 I more often rely on student performance data in 
lesson planning and individualizing instruction. 
i 	 ~ I am more self-reflective about my teaching1 
JI 	 practices.
! 
, 
, 
j j 
! 	 ~ I am more focuSed on my evaluation.I 
~ 	 I am less likely to leave the teaching profession 
4 
because~ 
i 
1 ~ 
l 
J, 
J 
1 
I 
J 
t 
1 
11!
J 
! 
I; 
i 
of performance pay. 
" 
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• How has the performance pay system at Eagle County 
Schools affected how long you plan on teaching? 
• I will stay with ECS longer. 
l 
! • It makes no difference. 
1 
,~ 
• I will leave ECS another district earlier. 
! • I will retire earl r than originally planned. 
j " 
,~ 
I • Don't Know 
i 
! 
i 
-j, 
t 
~ 
• Have you submitted an cation for the Excellence 
j 
I 
1 in Teaching Award (ETA) this year or last year? 
f 
I • Yes, I completed at st one entire application 
I process . 
.t 
i • I started the application process, but did not 
1 complete one.I 
l 
• No, I have never started an application processt 
i 
4 this year or st.l 
1 
• Don't Knowf 
I 
1 
i 
'Ii 
! 
• To what extent are you familiar with the "Professl 
Practices for Licen St f" rubric used in1 j 
I evaluation?J 
1 
• Very Familiar 
• Somewhat Famil r 
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• Not 	at all Familiar 
• Don't Know 
• Based on what you know about teacher evaluation 
system, 	 to what extent do you or disagree with 
lowing statements? 
• Strongly Agree 
• 
• sagree 
• Strongly Disagree 
• Don't Know 
~ My master teacher can fai y and accurately evaluate 
my rformance. 
~ My mentor teacher can fa ly and accurately evaluate 
my formance. 
~ My principal can fairly and accurately evaluate my 
performance. 
~ I generally support paying ses to teachers based 
on evaluations. 
~ ECS' evaluation system is more comprehensive than 
districts' evaluations. 
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);> I the ECS Professional Practices rubric 
ref s good teaching practices. 
);> Qual y teacher evaluation processes can improve 
instruction. 
);> I use my teacher evaluation results and feedback to 
improve my teaching. 
);> My ion is important because my pay is 
to it. 
);> My uation is important because Ips me be a 
r teacher for my students. 
);> More attention is paid to eva because of 
formance pay. 
• 	 Based on what you know about the test data, to 
what extent do you agree with the lowing 
statements? 
• 	 Strongly Agree 
• 
• sagree 
• 	 Strongly Disagree 
• 	 Don't Know 
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I ~ I understand how school-wide achievement is measured 
I 
1 
t! for the performance pay system.I 
~ 

I ~ I understand how district-wide achievement is
1 
I 
i 
I 
measured for the performance pay system. 
J ~ I generally support paying a bonus to teachers based 
on test scores. 
j ~ Quality student assessments can improve instruction. 
I 
i
•I 
~ I believe teachers have considerable impact on 
1 student achievement. 
t ~ Student assessment results are important because pay 
i 
, 
~ 
l 
is attached to them. 
1 
t ~ Student assessments are important because they help 

I in guiding instruction for my students. 

I ~ More attention is paid to student assessments 

because of performance pay.
1 
I 
I 
l j • To what extent are you satisfied with the following 
f aspects of your job?I 
• Very Satisfied 
• Somewhat Satisfied 
• Somewhat Dissatisfied 
• Very Dissatisfied 
• Don't Know 
I 
I 
1 
, 
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'I 
I 
~ 
;... Quality of my colleagues 
I ;... My base salary ( teaching in Colorado) II, ;... 	 My annual bonuses ~ 
! 
;... The quality of my Principal 
;... The quality of my ILT (Mentors and Masters) 
;... The overall quality of instruction at my school 
;... The quality of pro ssional development you receive 
before the starts 
;... The qual of pro sional development you receive 
dur the school year 
;... Cluster T 
;... My ability to 
;... Communication 
;... Communication 
influence decision-making 
from my school administration 
from the district administration 
• 	 To what extent do you agree with the following 
statements? 
• 	 Strongly Agree 
• 	Agree 
• 	 Disagree 
• 	Strongly agree 
• 	 Don't Know 
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~ 	 I feel support from teachers at my grade level. 
~ 	There is a "team" feeling at my school. 
~ I am becoming a better teacher because of the 
support and collaboration at my school. 
~ My input is valued at my school. 
~ It is very difficult for teachers to engage students 
that live in a poor home environment. 
~ 	If a student does not remember information I gave in 
a previous lesson, I know how to increase his/her 
retention in the next lesson. 
~ 	If I really try hard, I can get through to even the 
most difficult or unmotivated students. 
~ Teachers at my school trust each other. 
~ Teachers are willing to question one another's views 
on issues of teaching and learning. 
~ Teachers are expected to continually learn and seek 
out new ideas. 
~ Teachers are encouraged to take risks in order to 
improve their teaching. 
~ Teachers typically go beyond their classroom 
teaching to address the needs of students. 
~ Teachers do a good job talking through 'different 
views, opinions, and values. 
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> 	The principal at my school promotes collaborative 
problem solving and open communication. 
> 	The principal at my school creates a school culture 
and climate based on high expectations 
achievement. 
> A major motivator for me is helping 

> A major motivator for me is earning more money_ 

• 	 What is your primary reason for being a ? 
• 	 Open Response 
• 	 What effect, if any, has working in a pe rmance pay 
district had on your teaching? 
• 	 Open Response 
• 	 On the evaluation, in what category were you 
ranked as a teacher? 
• 	 Exceptional 
• 	 High Performing 
• 	 Professional - Commendable 
• 	 Professional - Meets Expectations 
• 	 Needs Improvement 
• 	 Unacceptable 
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• Don't Know/Not Applicable 
• Are there any r opinions, comments, or suggestions 
improvement to ECS' performance pay program 
were not covered your survey responses that you 
would like to share with us? If so, please use the 
below. 
• Open Response 
